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I. INTRODUCTION
This article describes a circuit split in which the Eighth Circuit
stands alone against eight other circuits,' including decisions
authored by such judicial luminaries as Learned Hand and Henry
3
Friendly. When the Seventh Circuitjoined the majority side of the
split in 2000, it remarked that the question "has been bouncing
t Thanks to Bob Long and my wife Shelley Finlayson, without whom this
article would not have been possible.
1. See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006)
(collecting cases).
2. Bailey v. Texas Co., 47 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1931).
3. Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1970).
1638
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around the federal courts of appeals for more than 75 years." 4 While
one might think such a lopsided and persistent division in authority
would pique the interest of the Supreme Court, in the decade since
the Seventh Circuit considered the question the Court has declined
the opportunity to resolve the issue twice, once from each side of the
circuit split.5 And though the Eighth Circuit still lacks for support
among its sister circuits, the Supreme Court's latest denial has• • 6
inspired scholarship in favor of the Eighth Circuit's singular view.
The issue in question involves the "forum defendant rule"-the
rule that a defendant in a non-federal-question case brought in state
court may not remove the case to federal court if any of the defen-
dants are citizens of the forum state More specifically, the issue is
whether the forum defendant rule is properly characterized as
jurisdictional or not. Part I of this article explains the forum defen-
dant rule in the context of the federal district courts' original
jurisdiction, the removal of state cases to federal court, and the
remand of cases back to state court. Part II describes the circuit split
and the arguments raised by courts in favor of and against ajurisdic-
tional characterization of the forum defendant rule. Part III presents
a plain language approach that the courts have not yet considered,
and also explains why the position of the Eighth Circuit is incorrect.
Part IV briefly concludes.
4. Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 2000).
5. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 549 U.S. 1207 (2007); Waugh v. Horton, 549
U.S. 813 (2006).
6. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55
(2008); Aaron E. Hankel, On the Road to the Merits in Our Federal System: Is the "Forum
Defendant Rule"a Procedural Speed Bump or aJurisdictional Road Block?, 28 WASH. U.J.L.
& POL'Y 427 (2008). Though Professor Dodson was among the attorneys responsible
for the certiorari petition in Lively, and thus was arguing for the Eighth Circuit's view,
he ultimately purports to refrain from taking a position on the merits of the question,
instead advocating for a framework for resolving similar questions. Dodson, supra at
58 n. 22,88-89. While Dodson's article is quite critical of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Lively, in fairness, this author was one of the attorneys responsible for the certiorari
petition from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir.
2005), cert. denied sub nom. Waugh v. Horton, 549 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-1419).
Given this article's criticism of the Eighth Circuit's decisions, I can hardly cast stones
in this regard.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). The text of the rule is:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properlyjoined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
2010] 1639
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II. THE FORUM DEFENDANT RULE
The general rule for removal to a federal court of cases originally
brought in a state court is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1441: "[A]ny civil
action brought in a State court" may be removed if "the district courts8
of the United States have original jurisdiction" over the case. The
district courts' original jurisdiction is defined in §§ 1330-1369.o Cases
based on a federal questionl ° are "removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. " " All other cases are remova-
ble "only if none of the parties in interest properlyjoined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought. 12 The latter rule comprises the "forum defendant rule."
The question that has split the circuits is whether a violation of the
forum defendant rule is 'jurisdictional." That is, when a defendant
removes a case from state court to federal court even though one of
the defendants is a citizen of the forum state, does the violation of the
rule mean that the district court has nojurisdiction and must remand
the case back to state court? Or is the violation instead the kind that
does not affect the district court'sjurisdiction? In the latter case, the
plaintiff must object or else waive the right to remand.
The question arises because the procedures for removal and re-
mand of cases from state court amount to a "remove first, ask
questions later" approach. A defendant can remove "any civil action"
simply by filing a signed notice in the appropriate federal district
court explaining the grounds for removal, along with a copy of the
process and pleadings in the case that have been served on the
defendant.13 The defendant must provide notice to all adverse parties
and a copy of the notice to the clerk of the state court.14 The state
court then "shall effect the removal" and proceeds no further unless
8. Id. § 1441(a).
9. In addition to the district courts' original jurisdiction for federal question
and diversity cases, federal law specifically provides for original jurisdiction for a
myriad of other cases. Id. §§ 1330, 1333-1335, 1338, 1343-1346, 1350, 1353. While
many such claims could potentially be brought originally in state courts, certain
matters are exclusively reserved to the district courts' original jurisdiction, such as
§ 1333 (admiralty), § 1334(a) (bankruptcy), § 1338 (patent), and § 1351 (cases
involving consuls or members of missions from foreign states).
10. Id. § 1331 (providing jurisdiction for all "civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
11. Id.§ 1441(b).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 1446(a) (emphasis added).
14. Id. § 1446(d).
1640 [Vol. 36:4
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there is a remand.1 5 The defendant can thus unilaterally remove "any
civil action" without the approval of either the state court or the
federal court.16 So long as the defendant files the notice in the
appropriate courts, the removal occurs regardless of whether the case
is technically "removable" under federal law. 7
The ability to remove does not mean that the case will remain in
federal court, of course. After a case is removed, a remand to the
state court is appropriate in two circumstances. 18 Under § 1447(c), if
it appears at any time that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, "the case shall be remanded."' 9 For example, a case in
which there is a lack of complete diversity, or in which the amount in
controversy is determined to be less than $75,000, must be remanded
for lack of subject matterjurisdiction. 2° Second, for any "defect other
than lack of subject matter jurisdiction," the plaintiff must file a
motion to remand the case within thirty days.2' So if the defendant
fails to sign the notice of removal or files the notice beyond the time
limit, the plaintiff must move the court within thirty days of the
removal in order to obtain a remand.22  But what if the case is
"nonremovable" because of the presence of a forum defendant and
plaintiff fails to move for remand within thirty days? If the forum
defendant rule is jurisdictional, the plaintiffs lack of objection is
immaterial and the case must be remanded. But if the forum
defendant rule is not jurisdictional, it is simply a "defect other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction" that the plaintiff may waive by
failing to object within the prescribed time period2 3
To complicate the question, under § 1447(d), "[a]n order re-
manding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1446(a) (2006).
17. Cf id. § 1441 (2006) (permitting removal only of cases in which the district
courts have original jurisdiction; non-federal-question cases removable only with no
forum defendant); id. § 1445 (describing "[n]onremovable actions"). Under the
liberal removal procedures of §1446, every action brought in state court is literally
.removable" in the sense that the defendant may have it transferred at least
temporarily to a federal district court. Accordingly, the so-called "nonremovable"
cases-i.e., cases in which the district courts lack original jurisdiction, non-federal
question cases with a forum defendant, and the cases listed in § 1441-would more
accurately be labeled as "remandable."
18. § 1447(c).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1332.
21. Id. § 1447(c).
22. See id. § 1446(a)-(b).
23. Id. § 1447(c).
2010]
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reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 4 On its face, § 1447(d) would
neatly take care of erroneous remands so far as the courts of appeals
are concerned by preventing all appellate review, 5 but the Supreme
Court has held that this provision must "be read in pari materia with
§ 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified inI- • ,,26
§ 1447(c) are immune from review. A district court's remand order
thus is reviewable on appeal unless it is "based on a timely raised
defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion." 2 The characterization of the forum defendant rule asjurisdic-
tional or not thus also controls whether a district court's order
remanding for a violation of the forum defendant rule (absent a
timely motion to remand) is reviewable on appeal. If the rule is
jurisdictional, the remand is based on one of the grounds specified in
§ 1447(c) -lack of subject matterjurisdiction -and for that reason is
"not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. But if the rule is a defect
"other than subject matterjurisdiction," review of the district court's
remand order is not precluded by § 1447(d).9
The prohibition on appellate review of most remand orders has a
peculiar effect on how the forum defendant rule issue arises in the
courts of appeals. In short, when a court is called upon to decide
whether the rule is jurisdictional, neither side will have an inherently
sympathetic position. The question can only come up once both sides
are culpable in part. First, there must be a violation of the forum
defendant rule, so the defendants arguing for a non-jurisdictional
interpretation typically will be the very parties that removed the case
despite the presence of a forum defendant, violating § 1441(b).
Second, the question will not arise if the plaintiff makes a motion to
remand within thirty days, so the plaintiffs arguing for ajurisdictional
forum defendant rule are typically the same parties that failed to
24. Id. § 1447(d).
25. In a dissenting opinion,Justice Scalia articulated this view:
In an all-too rare effort to reduce the high cost of litigation, Congress
provided that remand orders are completely unreviewable "on appeal or
otherwise." Section 1447(d) effectuated a tradeoff of sorts: Even though
Congress undoubtedly recognized that some remand orders would be entered
in error, it thought that, all in all,justice would better be served by allowing
that small minority of cases to proceed in state courts than by subjecting every
remanded case to endless rounds of forum disputes.
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225,268 (2007) (Scalia,J.,joined by Thomas,J, dissenting)
26. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995).
27. Id.
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interpose a timely objection.30 If the defendant were scrupulously
following the rules, there would be no removal in the first place and
therefore no forum defendant rule problem. One might conclude,
therefore, that the burden of complying should be put on the
defendant because to hold otherwise would reward a defendant who
flouts the rules with his forum of choice. But the plaintiff is often
equally culpable. If the plaintiff truly wishes to preserve her choice of
a state forum for resolution of the case, she would move to remand
the case within the prescribed period and the case would be re-
manded without controversy. Ajurisdictional characterization of the
forum defendant rule thus rewards an inattentive or ambivalent
plaintiff who does nothing to challenge the removal. While specific
fact patterns can be more sympathetic to one side or the other,3 the
breakdown that is required on both sides makes it difficult to place
the burden of compliance on one party over the other.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The split in the circuits on whether the forum defendant rule is a
jurisdictional requirement for removal or a waivable defect other than
subject matter jurisdiction has been widely acknowledged by the
32Eighth and other circuits and also by numerous commentators.
30. Id.
31. In Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts, Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006), for instance, the
defendant removed the case from a California court, stating in its notice that its
principal place of business was Colorado, though the court later determined that it
was a citizen of California. See Hankel, supra note 6, at 440-42. Under a nonjurisdic-
tional forum defendant rule, the Lively plaintiff must have challenged the removal
despite the defendant's assertion that it was not a forum defendant, a fact within the
defendant's knowledge. On the other hand, it is the plaintiff that chooses who is
named in the lawsuit, and the plaintiff could therefore be in a good position to
investigate the citizenship of the defendants before bringing suit. Moreover, the
forum defendant rule only prohibits removal where a "properly joined and served"
defendant is a citizen of the forum state. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). The plaintiff
will be in a better position to know whether all of the defendants are properlyjoined
and served, yet the defendant is still charged with removing the case in compliance
with the forum defendant rule within thirty days of receiving a copy of the initial
pleading. Id. § 1446(b). Of course, failure to comply with the time limit for removal
is itself a "defect other than lack of subject matterjurisdiction" which must be raised
by motion within thirty days of the removal lest it be waived. Id. § 1447(c).
32. Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Lively, 456 F.3d
at 940; Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 2000); Korea Exch.
Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1995); 16JAMESWM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 9 107.14(2) (e) (ii) ("The courts are split on whether
the ban on local defendants is procedural orjurisdictional."); Dodson, supra note 6,
at 79-85; Hankel, supra note 6, at 428-29; Brian W. Portugal, Note and Comment,
2010] 1643
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While the Supreme Court's only statement on the matter did not
acknowledge the circuit split or Eighth Circuit's precedent, it did note
that "several lower courts have held that the presence of a diverse but
in-state defendant in a removed action is a 'procedural' defect, not a
'jurisdictional' bar, and that the defect is waived if not timely raised by
the plaintiff.
33
The cases on both sides of the circuit split typically follow a stan-
dard fact pattern in which the plaintiff files suit initially in state court
and the case is subsequently removed on diversity grounds despite the
presence of a defendant in the forum state.4 The plaintiff then fails
to move for remand entirely3 5 or does so after more than thirty days
36have passed since the removal. From there, the district court holds
that the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional and remands to state
court on its own motion. On appeal, the question is whether the
district court's remand order was based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, in which case the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to
review the order, or whether it was a defect other than lack of subject
matterjurisdiction, in which case the plaintiffs failure to object may
38be construed as waiving the defect.
A. Circuits Holding that the Forum Defendant Rule is Nonjurisdictional
Most circuits to address the question have held that the presence
More Than a Legal Nicety: Why the Forum Defendant Rule of 28 U.S. C. Section 1441(b) is
Jurisdictional, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 1019, 1023-32 (2004).
33. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 90 n.6 (2005).
34. Lively, 456 F.3d at 935; Horton, 431 F.3d at 603-04; Hurley, 222 F.3d at 378;
Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 48, 50 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000);
Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., 179 F.3d 81,90 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999); KoreaExch. Bank,
66 F.3d at 47; In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1520 (5th Cir. 1991); Handley-Mack
Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435, 435-38 (6th Cir. 1924).
35. E.g., Lively, 456 F.3d at 935; Horton, 431 F.3d at 604; Hurley, 222 F.3d at 378-
79; Handelsman, 213 F.3d at 50; Handly-Mack, 2 F.2d at 436.
36. E.g., Shell, 932 F.2d at 1519.
37. E.g., Lively, 456 F.3d at 935; Horton, 431 F.3d at 604; Korea Exch. Bank, 66 F.3d
at 47. In some cases, the district court proceeded to final judgment and the plaintiff
raised the forum defendant rule violation on appeal, asserting that the presence of a
forum defendant defeatsjurisdiction. E.g., Hurley, 222 F.3d at 378-79; Farm Constr.
Servs. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1987).
38. E.g., Lively, 456 F.3d at 935-36; Horton, 431 F.3d at 604. In some cases, the
defendant seeks a writ of mandamus directing the district court to recall its remand
order, or the court of appeals construes an appeal from a district court's remand
order as a request for a writ of mandamus. E.g., Korea Exch. Bank, 66 F.3d at 51-52;
Shell, 932 F.2d at 1519. Despite this characterization, courts have recognized that the
order is unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) if a violation of the forum defendant
rule isjurisdictional. E.g., Korea Exch. Bank, 66 F.3d at 48; Shell, 932 F.2d at 1520.
[Vol. 36:41644
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of a defendant in the forum state does not preclude federaljurisdic-
tion over a case removed from state court. One additional circuit
has stated that its interpretation of § 1447(c) leads to the same
conclusion.40  These courts rely primarily on (1) the history and
language of the federal removal statutes, (2) the purpose of the forum
defendant rule, and (3) Supreme Court and other court of appeals
precedents.
1. The History and Language of the Removal and Remand Statutes
The characterization of the forum defendant rule asjurisdiction-
al or not arose even before 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) was enacted to provide
a statutory basis for remand of cases removed from state court. In
1924, the Sixth Circuit held in Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co.
that the rule was notjurisdictional.4 1 Handley-Mack involved much of
the fact pattern typical of forum-defendant-rule cases: a state action
removed by a forum-resident defendant, where no motion was made
to remand.42 Then, as now, the rule authorized removal from state
43
court in a diversity case only by a nonresident defendant. The court
compared the jurisdictional requirements for removal, viz. "diverse
state citizenship of the parties, or some otherjurisdictional fact," with
39. In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the forum defendant rule is procedural rather thanjurisdictional);
Lively, 456 F.3d at 940; Handelsman, 213 F.3d at 50 n.2 (plaintiff waived any objection
to forum defendant rule by failing to object within thirty days of removal); Hurley, 222
F.3d at 380; Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 90 n.3 (noting that presence of forum defendant
"is waived if not raised within 30 days after the notice of removal is filed"); KoreaExch.
Bank, 66 F.3d at 50 (concluding "that section 1441(b)'s bar against removal by a
forum-state citizen is notjurisdictional"); Shell, 932 F.2d at 1522 (presence of a forum
defendant is a nonjurisdictional "defect in the removal procedure"); Farm Constr.
Servs., 831 F.2d at 22 (removal with a forum defendant was "improper only for
technical reasons"); Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir.
1970) (explaining that if there was "no timely request for remand, the situation could
be considered to be as if the plaintiff had brought the action in the federal court,"
and "objection on the score of nonremovability would be deemed waived."); Bailey v.
Tex. Co., 47 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1931); Handley-Mack, 2 F.2d at 437.
40. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue, in Pacheco
dePerezv. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Circuit
stated in dicta that a violation of the forum defendant rule is waivable, and in Snapper,
Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir. 1999), the court stated that the 1996
revision of the statute suggests that "a removal in violation of 1441 (b) is subject to the
30-day time limit."
41. 2 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1924).
42. Id. at 435-36; see supra notes 34, 35, and accompanying text.
43. Handley-Mack, 2 F.2d at 435-38. See U.S.C. § 1447 (2006) for a modem
example of the rule.
2010] 1645
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"[f]ormal and procedural matters" under the applicable removal
statute, which had been held to be waivable. 44 The court reasoned
that neither the Constitution nor any statute limited "the original
jurisdiction" of the federal courts "to cases in which the defendant is a
nonresident of the state in which the suit is pending. ''45 "It is only the
removal clause in question which confines to a nonresident defendant
the authority [to remove] .46 Moreover, even in 1924, the Supreme
Court and other authorities had held that a district court retains
jurisdiction over an erroneously removed suit so long as the case is
within the court's original jurisdiction. The court concluded that
"' [i]f organic power to hear the controversy exists, it is immaterial
when or how the parties get into court."'48
Seven years later, Judge Learned Hand reviewed the authorities
and concluded that the decision in Handley-Mack "seems to us
conclusive. Indeed we cannot see any reasonable ground to distin-
guish the effect of such a removal from one made after the time
allowed by the statue, in which event it is settled that, if plaintiff
consents, the District Court has jurisdiction."49 In another Second
Circuit case, Judge Henry Friendly found Handley-Mack and Judge
Learned Hand's decision holding the forum defendant rule to be
nonjurisdictional were persuasive, stating that the court was "quite
content to follow our distinguished predecessors."'0
The current remand statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), was originally
enacted in 1948.51 At that time, the statute required remand "[i]f at
any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed
improvidently and withoutjurisdiction. 52 Although "improvidently"
and "withoutjurisdiction" werejoined by the conjunction "and" in the
original version of the statute, the courts consistently interpreted the
statute to provide two separate grounds for remand,53 and held that
"improvident" removals were those that implicated a defect in the
44. Handley-Mack, 2 F.2d at 436.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 437 (citing Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206 (1900)).
48. Id. (quoting Toledo, St. Louis & W. R. Co. v. Perenchio, 205 F. 472,476 (7th
Cir. 1913)).
49. Id.
50. Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880,882-83 (2d Cir. 1970).
51. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1447, 62 Stat. 937, 939 (1948) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006)).
52. Id.; Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2006).
53. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.7 (l1th Cir. 1999).
1646 [Vol. 36:4
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procedure for removal. 4 In 1988, Congress expressly separated the
two grounds for remand, amending § 1447 (c) to require a motion to
remand within thirty days of removal for "any defect in the removal
procedure."55 The 1988 version of § 1447 (c) also provided, "If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matterjurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."56 Despite the
clarification of what was meant by "improvident" removal, courts and
commentators were still unclear how to classify certain removal
requirements-like the forum defendant rule-that did not strictly
seem to be part of the removal procedure. 57 Nevertheless, most courts
interpreting the 1988 version held that the forum defendant rule is a
58nonjurisdictional defect in the removal procedure.
In 1996, Congress amended the statute again.59 The revised sta-
tute (which is the current statute) eliminated the "removal proce-
dure" language, instead requiring that "any defect other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days of filing the
notice of removal."6 The Eleventh Circuit remarked that "[t]he
revised language would seem to address neatly the issue that had
concerned courts under the 1988 version, suggesting that a removal
in violation § 1441 (b) [i.e., the forum defendant rule] is subject to the
30-day time limit."61 Other courts holding that the forum defendant
rule is a "defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction" have
likewise relied on this statutory history.62
54. See id. at 1254.
55. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4670 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
(2006)); see Lively, 456 F.3d at 939; Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1256.
56. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1256.
57. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 939; id. at 1258.
58. See Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50-51 (3d Cir.
1995); In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1523 (5th Cir. 1991). But see Hurt v. Dow
Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142,1145-46 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[S]ubject-matterjurisdiction is
not a mere procedural irregularity capable of being waived.").
59. See United States District Court: Removal Procedure, Pub. L. No. 104-219,
110 Stat. 3022 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006)).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
61. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1258.
62. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (agreeing "with the Eleventh Circuit's historical
analysis of§ 1447(c)"). Even after the 1996 revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) removed
the language requiring a "procedural" defect, courts have continued to characterize
the forum defendant rule as "more a matter of removal procedure, and hence
waivable, than a matter ofjurisdiction." Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377,
380 (7th Cir. 2000).
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2. The Purpose of the Forum Defendant Rule
Courts holding that the forum defendant rule is notjurisdictional
have also relied on the policy reasons behind limiting removal to out-
of-state defendants in the first place.63 The primary bases forjurisdic-
tion in the federal courts are the presence of a federal question and
diversity of citizenship between the litigants. Both bases for
jurisdiction are grounded in Article III of the Constitution. Whereas
institutional competency justifies providing a federal forum for
federal questions, the rationale for diversity jurisdiction is to prevent
the possibility of local prejudice in state courts against an out-of-state
litigant.6 Accordingly, where a defendant is haled into the court of a
foreign state, removal provides the opportunity for a forum presuma-
bly free from local prejudice. Where the plaintiff chooses the
defendant's state courts, however, the possibility for local prejudice is
not present, and thus there is arguably no need to provide a neutral
federal forum. 6' The forum defendant rule thus "is designed to
preserve the plaintiffs choice of a (state) forum, under circumstances
where it is arguably less urgent to provide a federal forum to prevent
prejudice against an out-of-state party., 68 Characterizing the forum
defendant rule as nonjurisdictional thus leaves the choice of forum in
the plaintiff's hands: if the plaintiff wishes to retain the state forum,
she need only file a timely remand motion; if the plaintiff is content
with a federal forum, she need do nothing. 69 A jurisdictional
63. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 939-40; Hurley, 222 F.3d at 380. As Professor Moore
explains, "[t]he policy behind the forum-defendant rule supports the nonjurisdic-
tional characterization." 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE
107.14(2) (e) (ii) (3d ed. 2010).
64. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (2006).
65. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority... [and] ... to Controversies... between
Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
66. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 940 (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236
F.3d 495,502 (9th Cir. 2001));J.A. Olson Co. v. Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir.
1987) ("Diversityjurisdiction exists for the purpose of providing a federal forum for
out-of-state litigants where they are free from prejudice in favor of a local litigant.").
67. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 940; Hurley, 222 F.3d at 380.
68. Hurley, 222 F.3d at 380; see also Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 ("Within this contextual
framework, the forum defendant rule allows the plaintiff to regain some control over
forum selection by requesting that the case be remanded to state court.").
69. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 940; cf Bailey v. Tex. Co., 47 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir.
1931) (holding that where there is "mutual consent.., the resulting situation is
equivalent to initiating an action in the District Court in which the defendant
appears"); Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1924) (finding that a "[p]laintiff's submission to defendant's removal proceeding" is
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characterization, however, would set the forum in stone even if the
plaintiff agreed to the federal forum. As the Seventh Circuit held,
"the only purpose that would be served by declaring the forum
defendant rule jurisdictional would be to preserve for plaintiffs rights
that the plaintiffs themselves failed to assert."70
3. Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Precedent
Courts holding that the presence of a forum defendant is not a
jurisdictional bar to proceeding in federal court following removal
have also relied on the "overwhelming weight of authority... on the
nonjurisdictional side of the debate." As detailed above, in a line of
cases starting in 1924, and with origins even earlier, the courts of
appeals have been nearly unanimous in holding that the forum
72
defendant rule is notjurisdictional. In addition to the many court of3
appeals decisions, the courts have also relied on "a series of cases in
which the Supreme Court consistently refused to treat the removal
statute as imposing independent jurisdictional requirements." 74 As
early as 1900, the Court held that a removal that was improper due to
the lack of a federal question did not divest the district court of
subject matterjurisdiction that existed on another ground.75 In 1913,
the Court held that an "irregularly removed" case did not lack for
jurisdiction so long as "there was the requisite amount and the
diversity of citizenship necessary to give the United States circuit court
jurisdiction of the cause. 7 6 Relying on these cases, the Court later
held in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp. that where a case had been
.a short cut" equivalent to discontinuing the suit in state court and filing it in the
district court).
70. Hurley, 222 F.3d at 380.
71. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940; id. at 379; see also Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise Sales
Corp., 66 F.3d 46,50 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the nonjurisdictional conclusion "is
consistent with the conclusions reached by almost every other court of appeals that
has addressed the issue," and that the "position is endorsed by several leading
commentators").
72. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., In reShell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518,1519 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
improper removal is a waivable defect).
74. Korea Exch. Bank, 66 F.3d at 49; see also In re1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d
378, 394 (5th Cir. 2009); Hurley 222 F.3d at 379; ("[T]he theme of several recent
Supreme Court decisions that have considered curable defects in diversityjurisdiction
has been to find that as long as the court's jurisdiction is proper at the time of trial
and judgment, the case need not be dismissed because of an earlier jurisdictional
problem.").
75. See Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 209 (1900).
76. Mackayv. Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176 (1913).
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improperly removed but was tried on the merits without objection,
the relevant issue "is not whether the case was properly removed, but
whether the federal district court would have had originaljurisdiction
of the case had it been filed in that court.", 7 The courts of appeals
have generally held that Grubbs "clearly suggested" that the removal
statute does not "impos [e] independentjurisdictional restrictions on
the federal courts." '
B. The Eighth Circuit's Holding that the Forum Defendant Rule is
Jurisdictional
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority favoring a nonju-
risdictional forum defendant rule, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the
contrary rule that the presence of any defendant in the forum state
divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction it would
otherwise have over a case removed from state court.79 In Hurt v. Dow
Chemical Co., the court considered whether a district court retained
diversityjurisdiction over a case improperly removed from state court
on the basis of federal questionjurisdiction, where the plaintiff moved
to remand nearly a year after the removal. 0 The court reasoned that
although "the District Court would have had diversity jurisdiction,"
the case would not have been removable because one defendant was a
citizen of the forum state. 81 Because "[t] he jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, both original and removal, is entirely a creature of
statute.... [i]f one of the statutory requirements is not met, the
,,812district court has nojurisdiction. The court held that the presence
of a forum-state defendant creates "an absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction" that "cannot be waived., 83 The Eighth Circuit distin-
guished the Supreme Court's decision in Grubbs on the basis that
Grubbs "expressly relied on the fact that the plaintiff had never
objected to removal in the district court," whereas the plaintiff in Hurt
did object, albeit nearly a year after the removal.8
The court reaffirmed its position that the forum defendant rule is
77. Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972).
78. Korea Exch. Bank,, 66 F.3d at 50; see also In re 1994 Exxon Chent. Fire, 558 F.3d at
394; Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2006); Farm
Constr. Servs. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1987).
79. Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. See id. at 1143-44.
81. Id. at 1145.
82. Id.
83. Id at 1146n. 1.
84. Id. at 1146.
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jurisdictional in Horton v. Conklin,85 acknowledging that there was
contrary authority from other circuits, but concluding that "Hurt sets
forth the better rule," and that "the violation of the forum defendant
rule is ajurisdictional defect., 8 6 Given the opportunity to reconsider
81
the holding in Hurt en banc, the Eighth Circuit declined.
IV. A VIOLATION OF THE FORUM DEFENDANT RULE DOES NOT
DIVEST A DISTRICT COURT OF SUBJECT MATIrERJURISDICTION
As described above, the judges who have concluded that the fo-
rum defendant rule is nonjurisdictional (including, among others,
Learned Hand and Henry Friendly) have given persuasive reasons for
doing so. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Hurt, in contrast, fails to
meet the majority of courts' arguments, neglecting to address the
history and language of the federal removal statutes or the purpose of
the forum defendant rule, and only superficially addressing Supreme
Court precedent.
The "overwhelming weight of authority ... on the nonjurisdic-
tional side of the debate"8 is correct for all of these reasons explained
above, but even courts on the majority side of the circuit split have yet
to fully analyze the plain language of the removal and remand statutes
since they were last revised in 1996. Below I present a plain language
argument for the nonjurisdictional characterization that precludes
finding that the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional.
A. The Eighth Circuit's Arguments in Support of aJurisdictional Forum
Defendant Rule
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Hurt relied on two arguments in
support of a jurisdictional characterization of the forum defendant
rule, neither of which is persuasive.
First, the court stated that a removing defendant "must meet the.. . . . ,,89
statutory requirements for removaljurisdiction. The court reasoned
that because the lower courts' jurisdiction is "entirely a creature of
statute [,] . .. " [i]f one of the statutory requirements is not met, the
85. 431 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 605.
87. Id., reh'g denied, No. 05-1199, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3245 (8th Cir. Feb. 9,
2006).
88. Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377,379 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotations
omitted).
89. Hurt, 963 F.2d at 1145 (emphasis added).
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district court has no jurisdiction.-9 ° But this argument holds little
water. Most notably, the court relies on the asserted requirements for
"removal jurisdiction," but removal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction "are not one and the same."9' Thejurisdictional ground
for remand in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is not lack of "removal jurisdic-
tion"-it is lack of "subject matterjurisdiction., 92 The subject matter
jurisdiction of the district courts is contained in the statutes specifical-
ly conferring jurisdiction, not in the removal statute.93 The Eighth
Circuit thus was incorrect to equate lack of a statutory requirement
for "removaljurisdiction" with a lack of "subject matterjurisdiction."
Second, the Eighth Circuit attempted to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision in Grubbs by asserting that unlike the plaintiff in
Grubbs, the Hurt plaintiff had objected to removal.94 In other words,
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a district court could have jurisdic-
tion over an improperly removed case if the plaintiff does not object
to the removal, but would lack jurisdiction if the plaintiff does object.
But this argument ignores the axiom that a court's jurisdiction does
not depend on the consent of the parties, and that a party may not
waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under the reasoning of
Hurt, a district court would lack jurisdiction over an improperly
removed case only if the plaintiff objected to the removal, but even if
there were no objection the court is still obliged to consider sua sponte
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Whether the plaintiff
objects to removal or not thus can have no effect on the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and afortiori is immaterial to whether a
particular condition of removal is or is notjurisdictional.
90. Id.
91. Codgell v. Wyeth, 366 F.3d 1245, 1247 (1lth Cir. 2004); see also id. at 1247-48
(discussing "removal jurisdiction"). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, removal
jurisdiction "requires more... than subject matterjurisdiction in the federal courts."
Id. at 1247 (emphasis added). For example, a district court can be said to lack
"removal" jurisdiction over a case if it was brought in the first instance in federal
court, because one obvious requirement for removal is that the case originate in state
court. Id. A district court likewise would lack removal jurisdiction if the defendant
never filed a notice of removal. Id. Yet neither of these circumstances would divest
the court of its subject matterjurisdiction as defined by federal statutes.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
93. Seeid. §§ 1330-1369.
94. Hurt, 963 F.3d at 1145-46.
95. Am. Fire& Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,18 n. 17 (1951) ("It needs no citation
of authorities to show that the mere consent of parties cannot confer upon a court of
the United States thejurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (quoting People's Bank
v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880))).
96. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 942 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006).
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B. A Plain Language Argument
Most of the cases holding that the forum defendant rule is not
jurisdictional were decided before the 1996 revision to the remand
statute.9' Accordingly, few of the courts on the majority side of the
split had the opportunity to closely consider the interaction between
the plain language of the amended statute and that of the forum
defendant rule. In the cases decided after 1996, the courts had a
long line of precedents upon which to rely, and may not have
perceived the need to closely consider the plain language of the
revised statute.99 But a new statute warrants a fresh examination of its
plain language. As I show below, a fresh examination of the language
here reveals that the forum defendant rule cannot be considered
jurisdictional.
The current version of § 1447(c) permits remand under two cir-
cumstances: (1) when a timely filed "motion to remand the case on
the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matterjurisdiction" is
made, and (2) if "the district court lacks subject matterjurisdiction."'00
Both circumstances depend on whether the basis for remand is or is
not a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction."'' If the basis is a lack of
subject matterjurisdiction, it need not be raised by motion within the
prescribed time period; if it is "a defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction," it must be raised by motion.1 2 I repeat myself
because the courts so far have not acknowledged that since 1996, the
lack ofjurisdiction required to remand under § 1447 (c) (and which is
insulated from review under § 1447 (d)) is lack ofjurisdiction over the
subject matter of the lawsuit. Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction
"over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought" or "the
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the
status of things." 10 3 It does not describe a court's jurisdiction over a
97. See cases cited supra, note 39.
98. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (agreeing with "the Eleventh Circuit's historical
analysis of § 1447(c)"); cf. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1258 (lth Cir.
1999) (stating that the 1996 revision of the statute suggests that "a removal in
violation of § 1441 (b) is subject to the 30-day time limit").
99. See, e.g., Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000)
(characterizing the forum defendant rule as "more a matter of removal procedure,"
despite that the 1996 revision removed the language requiring a "procedural" defect
for remand).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009).
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specific case, but rather the court's jurisdiction over the nature of the
case or the type of relief sought. In other words, a court's subject
matterjurisdiction is the abstract category of cases that it is permitted
to hear, not the list of cases that have actually been brought in the
court and which meet thejurisdictional and procedural requirements
to be heard. However one characterizes the requirement that cases
must lack a forum defendant to be removable, no case or article has
yet suggested that an in-state defendant divests the court ofjurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the lawsuit; for example, a diversity case
in which the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
amount.104 Rather, it is precisely the fact that the district court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter that raises the question whether it
may still adjudicate the case though the removal was improper.0 5 If
we take the "subject matter" limitation seriously, the forum defendant
rule cannot require remand where the plaintiff fails to raise it by
motion as required by § 1447(c).
Turning now to the removal statute, § 1441 (b) states that a "civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
104. Indeed, most courts, including in the Eighth Circuit, have held that the
presence of an in-state defendant does not forbid removal under the forum-
defendant rule if the forum defendant has not been served at the time of removal.
E.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Where there is complete
diversity of citizenship . .. the inclusion of an unserved resident defendant in the
action does not defeat removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b)." (emphasis in original));
Brake v. Reser's Fine Foods, No. 4:08CV1879 (JCH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5787, at *5
(E.D. Mo.Jan. 28, 2009); Stan Winston Creatures v. Toys "R" Us, 314 F. Supp. 2d 177,
180 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he language of§ 1441(b) makes plain that its prohibition
on removal applies only where a defendant who has been 'properlyjoined and served
is a resident of the forum state." (emphasis in original)); Ott v. Consol. Freightways
Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (S.D. Miss. 2002) ("[C]ourts have held, virtually
uniformly, that where, as here, diversity does exist between the parties, an unserved
resident defendant may be ignored in determining removability under 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (b)."); Wensil v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 792 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D.S.C.
1992); Republic Western Ins. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 628, 629 (N. D. Cal.
1991); see also 14B CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDwARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 at 784 (4th ed. 2009) ("[T] he language of
Section 1441 (b) ... implies that a diverse but resident defendant who has not been
served may be ignored in determining removability."); but see Sullivan v. Novartis
Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640,646-47 (D.N.J. 2008) (rejecting "plain meaning
application" of§ 1441 (b)).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). The argument could be made that for a removed
diversity case, the district court's subject matterjurisdiction is further limited to cases
with not only diversity of citizenship where the amount in controversy exceeds the
statutory threshold, but also those cases that lack a forum defendant, but that
argument would run afoul of the general grant of diversity jurisdiction. This is
because § 1331 assigns to the district courts "al/civil actions" that meet the amount in
controversy and diversity of citizenship requirements. Id. (emphasis added).
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on [a federal question] shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties," while "[a] ny other such action"
is subject to the forum defendant rule. °6 That is, the forum defen-
dant rule applies to any other "civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction. " '°7 This too bears repeating: it is only a
"civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction"
(based on grounds other than a federal question) that is subject the
forum defendant rule. So every forum defendant rule case is one in
which the district court has original jurisdiction. "Original jurisdic-
tion" is the power of a court to hear a case in the first instance and
one component of original jurisdiction is necessarilyjurisdiction over
the subject matter of the lawsuit. Reading the two statutes together,
the forum defendant rule applies only to cases in which the district
court necessarily has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
lawsuit. Under the plain language of § 1441(b) and § 1447(c),
therefore, a violation of the rule must be a "defect other than lack of
subject matter junsdcton" --- On that is waived if not raised by
motion within thirty days of removal.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has twice declined to grant certiorari to fi-
nally resolve whether a violation of the forum defendant rule is a
jurisdictional rule requiring remand or is instead a defect other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the plaintiff may waive by
failing to raise it in thirty days." 0 The Eighth Circuit too has declined
to hear the issue en banc, and has stated that its decision in Hurt "sets
forth the better rule.""I Nevertheless, in the vast majority of circuits, a
violation of the forum defendant rule does not preclude jurisdiction
where the plaintiff fails to object to the removal. When the issue
arises again, the Eighth Circuit should revisit its erroneous decision in
Hurt. Failing that, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and
106. Id. § 1441(b) (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. BLACK's LAW DIcrIoNARY930 (9th ed. 2009).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (emphasis added).
110. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 549 U.S. 1207 (2007) (denying certiorari in
case where the Ninth Circuit held the forum defendant rule to be nonjurisdictional);
Waugh v. Horton, 549 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-1419) (denying certiorari in case
where the Eighth Circuit held the forum defendant rule to be jurisdictional).
111. Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, No. 05-
1199, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3245 (8th Cir. Feb. 9,2006), cert. denied sub nom. Waugh
v. Horton, 549 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-1419).
2010] 1655
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/9
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
restore uniformity to the removal and remand of cases in the federal
112
courts.
112. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. At least two of the nine Justices,
Scalia and Thomas, are unlikely to vote for certiorari given that the issue most often
arises in the context of a challenged remand order and their view that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) means what it says about the remand orders not being reviewable "on
appeal or otherwise." Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 262 (2007) (ScaliaJ., dissenting,
joined by ThomasJ.). Justice Souter too would have adopted this view. Id. at 254.
(Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would reaffirm the rule that
a district court's remand order is unreviewable even if it is based on an erroneous
understanding of the district court's jurisdiction."). Justice Souter's former seat is
now held by Justice Sotomayor, who authored an opinion in Handelsman v. Bedford
Vill. Assocs. Ltd., 213 F.3d 48, 50 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000), holding that the forum defendant
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